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ELIMINATING THE NONCONFORMING USE IN KENTUCKY
This note on the Kentucky law of nonconforming uses includes
four areas of discussion: (1) when a use is "vested" so as to be entitled
to immunity from the zoning restrictions; (2) the constitutional means
of immediate termination of these inconsistent uses-abatement of
nuisance, condemnation, and public purchase; (3) the traditional
restrictions on change and extension of use, alteration and repair,
reconstruction, and resumed use after abandonment-designed to
"starve" out nonconforming uses; (4) a realistic and equitable theory
for amortizing the life of nonconforming uses which will provide
assured compensation in return for assured elimination.
Introduction
In 1928, Kentucky followed the Supreme Court of the United
States in upholding zoning as a valid exercise of the police power.1
The Supreme Court had two years earlier in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.2 approved a zoning ordinance which divided an
Ohio town into classes of use districts and prohibited incompatible
uses within those districts. The Euclid decision marked the beginning
of an era of judicially-sanctioned use zoning. The object of this theory
of zoning is to "foster improvement by confining certain classes of
buildings and uses to certain localities without imposing undue
hardship upon the property owners."3 Because uses are classified
and segregated under a "Euclidean" zoning ordinance, those noncon-
forming uses which existed prior to passage of the ordinance pose a
ready-made problem.
In few instances have municipalities begun their community
existence with a zoning scheme; usually an old town is divided into
geographical use districts by a new ordinance. Without prior planning
and regulation it is only natural to find residential, commercial, and
industrial uses in each other's back yard in disaccord with the new
use restrictions.
There are several reasons why these nonconforming uses have
been allowed to remain. Foremost is the right to the use of property
free from unreasonable regulation under the police power.4 Zoning
has traditionally been considered as having only a prospective opera-
1 Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742, 7 S.W. 2d 219 (1928).
2272 U.S. 65 (1926).
3 Goodrich v. Selligman, 298 Ky. 863, 183 S.W. 2d 625, 627 (1944).
4 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Ky. Const. § 1; cf. O'Connor v. City of
Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P. 2d 401 (1949).
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tion,5 and when made to apply retroactively it has been held to be
unreasonable regulation.6 Another reason for allowing these uses to
remain is the economic hardship which might result. Due to lot size,
topography and other physical factors, the owner cannot get a
reasonable return from such "landlocked" property as a conforming
use, and the cost of relocation would be too great a burden to place
upon him alone. As a practical matter, some nonconforming uses
justify their continued existence by providing service needs to their
particular neighborhood; grocery stores, drug stores, and churches are
convenient to, and perhaps not really incompatible with, their resi-
dential neighborhood.
7
With regard to nonconforming uses initially, planners adopted a
"bands-off" policy because of the doubtful constitutionality of im-
mediate termination without compensation.8 They could not afford
to arouse public antagonism over existing uses at the expense of the
whole zoning plan. In addition, it was generally felt that existing
nonconforming uses would eventually "rot out" due to the limitations
placed on expansion and reconstruction of such uses.
But it has since become apparent that the early planners were
only half right-the old uses did rot, but not out.9 The obvious reason
for their survival is that the zoning ordinances, with their prohibition
5 The Kentucky court stated in Fowler v. Obier, supra note 1 at 749, 7 S.W.
2d at 222:
Zoning ordinances and laws do not look to the past so much as
to the future. Where mistakes have been made in the past, zoning
must recognize actual conditions and follow such plans as will be
best under all the circumstances.
6 Standard Oil Co. v. City of Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362, 50 S.W. 2d 960
(1932); Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930). The public
policy against retroactive laws is reflected generally in Ky. Rev. Stat. § 446.080
(3) (1892) which provides that "No statute shall be construed to be retroactive,
unless expressly so declared." Existing nonconforming uses are specifically pro-
tected under Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 100.068-069 (1942, as amended 1948) (first class
cities) and § 100.355 (1952) (second class cities); no provision is made for
protection of nonconforming uses in third through sixth class cities. See comment,
4 Vill. L. Rev. 416 (1959).
7 See Coldston and Scheuer, "Zoning of Planned Residential Developments,"
73 Harv. L. Rev. 241, 246 (1959).
8 just four years prior to the Euclid decision, Justice Holmes had warned that:
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking....
We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by
a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
0 It is ironic that James Metzenbaum, who was the victorious counsel in the
Euclid case, predicted in 1980 that "within a period of another twenty years, a
large number of such 'non-conforming' uses will have disappeared.... " Metzen-
baum, Zoning 288 (1930). Never saying die, Metzenbaum in 1955 reaffimed his
former position, declaring that "Within a period of another quarter century, a
large number of such non-conforming uses' will have disappeared...." 2
Metzenbaum, Zoning 1211 (2d ed. 1955).
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of new nonconforming uses, operated to grant the old uses a
monopolistic position in their neighborhood.' 0 Consequently, many
old buildings permitted to exist, but the renovation of which is for-
bidden, detrimentally affect the neighboring property values and
contribute to the spread of urban blight and congestion." They
create an unwholesome environment for homes12 and overburden
municipal services.' 3 Thus it has been said that "the fundamental
problem facing zoning is the inability to eliminate the nonconforming
use."14
Existing Use
Before the problem of eliminating the use arises, it first must be
found that it is an existing use; otherwise it is entitled to no protection
from the zoning classification. The right to a use which the courts
will protect is generally labelled a vested right. In the final analysis,
a use will be held vested by a court after weighing the public interest
against the private investment and determining whether "the property
interest affected by the particular ordinance is too substantial to
justify its deprivation in light of the objectives to be achieved by
enforcement of the provision."15 It is settled that mere adaptability
for a particular use, contemplation of use, a permit to establish the
use, and even a contract to construct the use do not constitute such
a substantial property interest as to be awarded the status of a vested
right.16 There must be something beyond mere preparation. 17
In Darlington v. Board of Councilmen of City of Frankfort,8 the
'0 Norton, "Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures," 20 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 305, 808 (1955).
11 For a survey of land uses in a city of 80,000, in which the writer concludes
that "the presence of nonconforming uses and buildings produces breakdown and
blight in residential districts," see Note, 30 Ind. L.J. 521, 524 (1954).
12 'At a public hearing called to consider the adoption of a zoning ordinance
one citizen stated that during his lifetime his family had built six homes, each
successive home being farther removed from the city's center than the last,
that each home had been well built but had to be abandoned because the
environment of the neighborhood became objectionable as the result of the
intrusion of non-residential uses. Each of the old homes was sold at a small
sum compared with its original cost, and all but one were still standing.'
Haar, Land-Use Planning 264 (1959),
13 The location of conflicting land uses in a zone complicates the task of
administration in making assessments, locating schools, providing police pro-
tection, preventing and fighting fires, developing street plans, regulating traffic,
and providing sanitary services. Note, 30 Ind. L.J. 521, 523, n. 17 (1954).
14 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P. 2d 34, 40
(1954).
15 People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E. 2d 34, 35 (1952).
36 1 Antiean, Municipal Corporation Law § 7.07 (1958); Note, I Current
Mun. Prob., No. 2, 109 (1959).
17 See 45 Ky. L.J. 205 (1956).
18 282 Ky. 778, 140 S.W. 2d 392 (1940).
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plaintiff had purhcased property in a residential neighborhood with
the intention of converting it into a florist shop. After she had removed
a tree, made limited excavations and sold a few flowers, the city
passed an interim zoning ordinance and prevented her from proceed-
ing with the work. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's right
to the commercial use had become "'vested' . . . when, prior to the
enactment of [the interim ordinance], the owner . . . in good faith
substantially entered upon the performance of the series of acts
necessary to the accomplishment of the end intended."' 9 The sub-
stantial performance test is ultimately a question of degree depending
upon the particular facts of each case and the court's attitude toward
the economic effects of zoning. From the facts of the Darlington case,
it is evident the Kentucky court will shield from zoning classifications
a lesser degree of performance than will be protected in other
jurisdictions.20
Even if there has been substantial performance and actual use, it
must have been continuously operated in nonconformity to be granted
immunity when the ordinance is adopted. Thus in Durning v. Sum-
merfield,2 1 it was held that occasional use of a vacant lot by carnivals
over a ten year period did not establish a vested right. The court said
that an existing use is "what is customarily or habitually done or the
subject of a common practice."
22
If the right of use is not vested when the zoning ordinance is
passed, any nonconformity may be summarily terminated. But if the
owner has acquired a vested right, the municipality faces a problem
of constitutional elimination. If such use constitutes a nuisance it may
be promptly abated; otherwise immediate termination must pay its
way by condemnation award or public purchase.
Nuisance
Although the law of nuisance has the advantage of immediate
termination without compensation, it has a limited application in the
eradication of nonconforming uses. Most such uses do not materially
interfere with the enjoyment of neighboring property, although they
may be offensive to aesthetic sensitivities and cause depreciation of
property values, and city officials cannot declare a use to be a
19 Id. at 785, 140 S.W. 2d at 896.20 Compare A and P Mobilehome Court, Inc. v. Town of Groton, 21 Conn.
Supp. 275, 154 A. 2d 243 (1959); Griffin v. County of Matin, 157 Cal. App. 2d
507, 321 P. 2d 148 (1958); Caruthers v. Board of Adjustment of the City of
Bunker Hill Village, 290 S.W. 2d 840 (Tex. 1956).
21235 S.W. 2d 761 (Ky. 1951).
22 Id. at 763.
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nuisance when it is not a nuisance in fact.23 The point was well stated
recently by the Maryland court:
24
The law of nuisances has limits that many times make its use fall
short of the objective. Some courts will restrain only common law
nuisances and even where the lawmakers have expanded the
nuisance category, judicial enforcement seems often to have been
restricted to uses that cause a material and tangible interference with
the property or personal well-being of others, uses that are equivalent
to or are likely to become common law traditional nuisances.
25
Eminent Domain
An experiment in zoning by eminent domain preceded zoning
under the police power; 26 however, less than one percent of the area
to which it applied was zoned,27 the obvious reason for its failure
being the enormous expense involved.28 Although it would be neces-
sary to condemn only the use, and not the fee, the municipality in
every instance would be faced with paying the owner of the noncon-
forming use the difference between the fair market value of the
property as a nonconforming use and as a conforming use. A city's
budget could be wrecked by one case such as Hadacheck v. Sebastian29
where this difference amounted to $740,000. In addition to the
expense problem, the validity of eminent domain zoning was early,
and successfully, challenged on the ground that the nonconforming
uses are not condemned for public use.30 Achieving conformity to
zoning regulations, however, would seem to secure a public advantage
similar to that of urban redevelopment, for which condemnation has
been approved. 31
2 3 City of Mt. Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 287 Ky. 781, 155 S.W. 2d
237 (1941).
24 Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A. 2d
363 (1957).
251d. 129 A. 2d at 366.
26 Minn. Laws 1915, ch. 128 §§ 1-7. The first zoning ordinance, as we know
it today, was enacted by New York City in 1916. Bassett, zoning 20 (1940).
27 Comment, 1951 Wis. L. Rev. 685, 696.
28 Unless zoning in cities can be done under the police power ... it would
be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to do it otherwise, as we can
hardly perceive how it might be accomplished through the exercise of
eminent domain . Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742, 752, 7 S.W. 2d 219, 223
(1Q98N.
29239 U.S. 894 (1915). A more striking illustration of the unbearable
expense which eminent domain would entail involves residential restrictions in oil
country; see, e.g., Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F. 2d 528
(9th Cir. 1931).
30 Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Bd. of Com'rs of Cleveland Metropolitan Park
Dist., 104 Ohio St. 447, 135 N.E. 635 (1922).
31 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see Note, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 91,
93 (1953); Note, 58 Yale L.J. 599 (1949).
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Public Purchase
The third way to eliminate nonconforming uses immediately is
public purchase, which merges the law of eminent domain, zoning,
and improvement assessments. The cost of terminating the use is
assessed to its neighbors. This device has the advantage of spreading
the economic burden among those who benefit, but it raises the same
objections as eminent domain, and the gain to the community usually
is not worth the purchase price. However, some writers feel that
eminent domain or public purchase may be used advantageously in
particular situations where "great public good will result from a pur-
chase which can be made at a price within reason."
32
Although the early zoning enthusiasts dreamed of immediate
elimination of nonconforming uses, they realized the impracticality of
the means available and settled for a gradual elimination which they
hoped would result from ordinance restrictions on future improvement
of the old uses. The effect of these traditional restrictions, in theory
at least, is to harass the nonconformists until continuance of the use
becomes unprofitable.
33
Change of Use
Even though the legislative policy of most states is to allow
existing uses to continue in nonconformance, 4 the general rule is
that an existing use cannot be converted to a different nonconforming
use.35 Any new structures, methods, objectives, or results of an enter-
prise must accord with the original nature and purpose of the use.86
A change of ownership or expiration of a lease alone does not violate
the test,87 but the purchaser or lessee cannot deviate from his
grantor's use. In Feldman v. Hesch,3 8 a lessor, who had used a non-
conforming garage in which to park his trucks and make minor repairs,
leased the garage to a used car dealer who used it for washing, paint-
ing, repairing, and generally reconditioning his autos. The Kentucky
court condemned the lessee's operations as an invalid change of use,
82 Comment, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 442, 453 (1959); Comment, 1951 Wis. L.
Rev. 685, 697.33 Anderson, "The Nonconforming Use-A Product of Euclidean Zoning," 10
Syracuse L. Rev. 214, 221 (1959).
34 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 7.07 (1958); 1 Yokley, Zoning
Law and Practice § 149 (2d ed. 1953).
35 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.202 (3d ed. 1957).
36 A. L. Carrithers & Son v. City of Louisville, 250 Ky. 462, 469, 63 S.W. 2d
493 (1933); De Felice v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of East Haven, 130
Conn. 156, 32 A. 2d 635, 638 (1943).
87 O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P. 2d 401, 404 (1949).
SB 254 S.W. 2d 914 (Ky. 1953).
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applying the test of whether "the kinds of activities principally
carried on under the second use were only incidental to some other
major activity under the former use."3 9 [Emphasis added.]
The Carrithers4" and Feldman decisions would seem to bring Ken-
tucky in line with the prevailing judicial rule that no change of use
may be made. But in 1948, the legislative policy with respect to
change of use was revised to permit "a nonconforming use of a build-
ing or structure to be changed to another nonconforming use of the
same or more restricted classification."41 This provision is ambiguous
as to the meaning of "classification." It is susceptible of two interpre-
tations, in order of probable legislative intent: First, that it refers to
the classification of the highest (most restrictive) district in which
the use would be allowed if conforming, so that a grocery store in a
district zoned residential may be changed to any other use allowed in
the highest district permitting grocery stores. Second, that it means a
use may be changed to any other use which is no more objectionable
in degree of nonconformity, so that, where the ordinance permits a
beauty parlor, a shoe repair shop and a supermarket in the same
district, the beauty parlor may be changed to a shoe repair shop but
not to a supermarket because of increased traffic, noise and dirt
generated by such use.
Feldman, which was decided after the 1948 revision but which
conspicuously fails to mention it, apparently stands for the second-
and more restrictive-interpretation, as shown by the court's emphasis
on the increased burden imposed upon the residential district by the
new use.42 A more recent case, City of Bowling Green v. Miller,
43
where the court stressed the "shift from the passive use of the building
for storage and sales purposes to a manufacturing enterprise,"44 also
sustains this interpretation without referring to the statute.
Extension of Use
Zoning ordinances usually provide that nonconforming uses shall
not be extended except in conformity with the regulations. 4" But an
increase in volume of business alone is not an invalid extension. 40
39 Id. at 916.4 0 A. L. Carrithers & Son v. City of Louisville, supra note 36.
4 3Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.069 (1948) (for first class cities) and § 100.355 (2)
(1948) (for second class cities); there are no nonconforming use provisions for
third through sixth class cities.4 2 Feldman v. Hesch, 254 S.W. 2d 914, 916 (Ky. 1953).
43 335 S.W. 2d 893 (Ky. 1960).
44 Id. at 894.
-1 E.g., Lexington, Ky., Zoning Ordinance-Resolution § 5.225 (1953).
46 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.207 (3d ed. 1957).
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And where, due to increased volume of business or because of the
nature of the use, (e.g., extraction industries) or for other reasons,
the use seeks to expand its area, there is a division of authority.47
Courts adhering to the "natural expansion" rule permit a noncon-
forming use to be extended to the limits of its original lot, 48 while
courts following the "precise magnitude" rule limit the use to the
exact area occupied when the ordinance was inacted.4
In the two extension cases considered by the Kentucky court,
it was held that the Louisville board of appeals wrongfully denied
permits for additions to nonconforming uses. The Carrithers" de-
cision allowed an extension in order to comply with local health
regulations under a provision permitting additions only as required
by some law or ordinance.51 But in 1948, the "no addition" limitation
was deleted from the statute,52 and in 1949, the Court of Appeals held
that the enabling act does not prohibit additions to nonconforming
uses.
5 3
Alteration and Repair
Most zoning ordinances limit structural alteration to those repairs
required by the building inspector to make the building safe.54 A
strict construction of the term "structural alteration" is necessary
if the purpose of such ordinance provisions is to be effected; otherwise
"a nonconforming use might permanently be 'zoned-in' rather than
'zoned-out."55 The Kentucky court supplied this strict construction
in Selligman v. Von Alimen Bros.56 There the owner of a milk plant
was required by the health inspector to repair his roof and inside
walls; while constructing a new roof it became apparent the old walls
were so decayed they would not support it, and the owner began
construction of brick walls in place of the old wooden ones. When the
walls were ninety percent completed the building inspector stopped
the work because the new walls amounted to a structural alteration.
47 Note, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 91, 98 (1953).
48See 2 Metzenbaum, Zoning 1227 (2d ed. 1955); Craig, Zoning Law, U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 223, 228 (1959).
49 See 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 7.07 at 446 (1958).
50 A. L. Carrithers & Son v. City of Louisville, supra note 36.51 At the time of the Carrithers decision the health and safety exception was
not specifically provided for by statute-only by the ordinance in question-but it
was subsequently made an express statutory provision by Ky. Acts 1942, ch.
176 § 8.
52Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.069 (1948).
53Butler v. Louisville & Jefferson County Board of Zoning Adjustment and
Appeals, 311 Ky. 663, 224 S.W. 2d 658 (1949).5 4
E.g. Lexngton, Ky., Zoning Ordinance-Resolution § 5.224 (1953).5 5 MandeLer, "Prolonging the Nonconforming Use: Judicial Restriction of the
Power to Zone in Iowa," 8 Drake L. Rev. 23. 24. (1958).
56297 Ky. 121, 179 S.W. 2d 207 (1944).
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In upholding the board of appeals' refusal to allow completion, the
court said: "The present use of a nonconforming building may be
continued but it cannot be increased nor can it be extended indefinitely
if zoning is to accomplish anything.. . "7 Therefore, "the owner can
make no structural alteration in the building which will indefinitely
prolong its life."5 8 [Emphasis added.]
This rule is the backbone of the traditional means of eliminating
nonconforming uses, and its adherence yields the only hope of a
gradual conformance. But the 1948 statutory revision59 annulled the
staunch position taken by the Court of Appeals, and the next year
Commissioner Stanley, speaking for the court, interpreted the legis-
lative intent as prohibiting structural alteration or reconstruction only
when it constitutes a forbidden change of use.a0
Destruction and Reconstruction
Where a nonconforming building has been damaged or destroyed
by "fire, flood, explosion, earthquake, war, riot or other act of God"
zoning ordinances commonly permit reconstruction if the damage
does not exceed a specified percentage (averaging from 60% to 75%)
of the assessed or fair market value at the time damaged.,'
In some states, the percentage provision is incorporated in the
enabling act, as it was in Kentucky until deleted by the 1948 statutory
revision.62 In 1953, the Court of Appeals held the owner of a non-
conforming service station, restaurant, and tavern, which had been
totally destroyed by flood, was entitled to rebuild his old uses.03
Thus Kentucky again departed from the traditional restrictions on
nonconforming uses and now permits reconstruction, no matter how
great the damage.
Abandonment
Not only must the nonconforming use be existing when the zoning
ordinance is passed, but it must continue without interruption to
retain its immunity to the use restrictions. Some ordinances require
abandonment, while others require only discontinuance, which may
571d. at 124, 179 S.W. 2d at 209.
58 Id. at 126, 179 S.W. 2d at 210; see Goodrich v. Selligman, 298 Ky. 863,
183 S.W. 2d 625 (1944); A. L. Carrithers & Son v. City of Louisville, 250 Ky.
462, 63 S.W. 2d 493 (1933).59 Ky. Rev. Stat. H 100.069 (1948), 100.355 (1952).
00 Butler v. Louisville & Jefferson County Board of Zoning Adjustment and
Appeals, supra note 53 at 665, 224 S.W. 2d at 660.
61 E.g., Lexington, Ky., Zoning Ordinance-Resolution § 5.223 (1953); see
Horack and Nolan, Land Use Controls 157 (1955).
62 Ky. Acts 1942, ch. 176 § 8.
63 Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Commission v. Stoker,
259 S.W. 2d 443 (Ky. 1953).
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be involuntary. But the two terms are often confused, both in the
ordinances64 and by the courts,65 and it is usually held the owner may
resume a use which he involuntarily stopped. 6 Nonuse due to acts of
God, war, inability to rent, financial difficulty, business conditions,
and seasonal business lacks the requisite intent to prohibit resump-
tion. 7 Illustrative of this point is Louisville & Jefferson County Plan-
ning & Zoning Commission v. Stoker,18 where the owner was permitted
to resume his nonconforming use after seven years of inactivity
resulting from a flood.
The 1948 legislative revision which permitted change, extension,
alteration, and reconstruction of nonconforming uses left Kentucky
with virtually no means of eliminating such uses. From the Court
of Appeals came the comment that "though the effect of these
amendments is to weaken the law and remove it from accord with
the general concept of a gradual complete conformity, the legislature
has ordered it." 9 The revision is inconsistent with the Euclidean
theory of use classification in that it encourages nonconformity, but
it is not totally indefensible. Perhaps the change was produced by
a realization of the weakness inherent in the concept of use classifica-
tion: that present zoning measures are directed solely at the type of
use, regardless of their actual compatibility with the surrounding
neighborhood. Prominent zoning authorities 0 have challenged the
Euclidean theory and are advocating a new concept of "performance
zoning" which emphasizes the harmful effects of the use rather than
its mere species. 71 But it is safe to assume that the Kentucky legislature
6
4 E.g., Lexington, Ky., Zoning Ordinance-Resolution § 5.222 (1953)-the
provision is entitled "Discontinuance," but it must be voluntary.
05 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 7.07 at 449 (1958); 8 MeQuillin,
Municipal Corporations § 25.193 (3d ed. 1957).
06 City of Bowling Green v. Miller, 385 S.W. 2d 893, 894 (Ky. 1960).
07 2 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning 63-70 (1957).
08 259 S.W. 2d 443 (Ky. 1953); compare Durning v. Summerfield, 235 S.W.
2d 761 (Ky. 1951).
60 Butler v. Louisville & Jefferson County Board of Zoning Adjustment and
Appeals, supra note 53 at 665, 224 S.W. 2d at 660.70 Haar, Foreword (Zoning Symposium), 36 B.U.L. Rev. 331, 334 (1956);
Horack, "Performance Standards in Residential Zoning," 1952 Planning 153;
Norton, 'Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures," 20 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 305, 314 (1955)' O'Harrow, "Performance Standards in Industrial Zoning,"
1951 Planning 42; Redman, "Performance Standards in Zoning," 1952 Planning
150; Ruth, "Is It Legal?," 1950 Planning 157, 164. Recent zoning amendments
in Chicago and New York employ performance standards in industrial zoning; see
Babcock, "The New Chicago Zoning Ordinance," 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 174, 182
(1957); Committee Report, "The City Planning Commission's Proposal for a
New Zoning Resolution," 15 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 119, 125, 132 (1960).
71 The weakness of zoning by use, instead of effect, is shown in the Car-
rithers case where the neighbors of a milk factory complained of 24-hour noise,
traffic, smoke, and rats; the court held such evidence to be immaterial to the
zoning issue. A. L. Carrithers & Son v. City of Louisville, 250 Ky. 462, 63 S.W.
(footnote continued on next page)
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was motivated by reasons other than the questionable policy behind
use classification since no alternative measure were taken to reduce
effects even at which performance zoning is aimed. The statutory
change more likely represents a return to the defense of private
property rights, in contrast to the great majority of states which has
yielded to society's need for control.
When one buys commercial property he expects to be able to
change its use, expand it, or make structural alterations as the oppor-
tunity for profit demands. Any law which subsequently overturns
these expectations is retroactive, and the disease which such legislation
is designed to cure must be very serious to warrant cutting off any
expectations backed by capital investment. The fundamental question
is which of the expectations entertained by the builder or purchaser
at the time of his investment should be protected from the application
of the new zoning law. The General Assembly has deemed all these
expectations entitled to protection, conceding to the societal interests
only the prohibition against a "more objectionable" use of property.
Recognizing the conflicting public and private needs, the argument
for protecting the expectation of changing use is stronger than that
for allowing structural change or expansion. By prohibiting only
change to more objectionable uses the emphasis is being properly
placed on the harmful effects of the use rather than the mere type of
use. And because most investments in commercial property are made
in reliance on the expectation of rental value, regardless of use, it is
unfair to forbid a different but suitable use merely because the
existing use failed due to financial difficulty or for some other reason.
This, of course, will not hold true for special structures, such as service
stations, which the owner expects to use only for its original purpose
-his investment was not made on the basis of an expectation of
changing use.
On the other hand, allowing structural change or expansion after
the effective date of the ordinance is harder to defend on the grounds
of expectation, because the owner has not backed up these expecta-
(footnote continued from preceding page)
2d 493 (1933). Performance zoning operates on objective standards, measured
by exact scientific instruments, in the areas of smoke, noise, odor, dust and dirt
noxious gases, glare and heat, radiation and fire hazards, wastes, traffic, and
aesthetics. O'Harrow, "Performance Standards in Industrial Zoning," 1951 Plan-
ning 42. Under such standards, "industry, business, and homes could be located
on any site in any zone so long as the intended use met adequate performance
standards." Horack, "'Performance Standards in Residential Zoning 1952 Plan-
ning 153. Performance standards have long been judicially applied in instances
where commercial or industrial uses are allowed to continue only if their injurious
effects are eliminated; see Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104
N.E. 371 (1914).
[Vol. 49,
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tions with capital investment at the time the ordinance is passed. That
is, a change in use requires no new capital investment, the change
being part of what the owner expected to accomplish with his original
investment. But a change in structure requires a new capital invest-
ment-the owner could not have expected his original investment to
accomplish this.
To permit such structural change or expansion would be to allow
the owner to invest more money on the basis of needs and opportuni-
ties arising after the original investment and after passage of the
zoning restrictions. The expectation of changing use, because originally
backed by investment, may be considered a property right which
cannot be taken without compensation. But the expectation of
structural change or expansion is not a property right because not
originally backed by investment and therefore should not be immune
to the retroactive effect of the new ordinance. The ordinance, of
course, can prospectively prohibit future investment; it is the essence
of legislation that expectations that a person will be allowed to make
some future investment can be cut off at any time.
However, assuming the propriety of Euclidean zoning, and even
if the traditional methods of eliminating the nonconforming use were
available to Kentucky zoning officials and were strictly enforced by
them, it is doubtful whether they afford an adequate solution to the
nonconforming use problem. As pointed out, these uses are granted
a monopoly and protected from competition by the municipality,
and although the structures are forced to physical decay to the point
of becoming unsafe, as monopolies they have an uncanny ability to
survive. Consequently, these limiting measures disregard the problem
of preserving neighborhood property values during the life of the use,
whatever effect they may have on long-range improvement. Home
owners would prefer to live next to a modem brick grocery store
than to a run-down frame structure. What is more, the grocery store
may be desirable as a service use in the residential neighborhood, but
the restrictions apply alike to all uses.
If Euclidean zoning is to be retained as the means of protecting
home environment and property values, there must be assurance that
nonconforming uses will be terminated, though termination would
necessarily entail greater restriction on the free use of private property.
But zoning may be seen as fulfilling the changing needs of a complex
society, as well as a restraint on economic freedom. As a revolutionary
concept in 1916, zoning was thought justified as a barricade against
the effects of the Industrial Revolution, although it required restriction
on the free use of private property. In almost a half century of further
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industrial and commercial expansion, zoning has demonstrated its
inability to cope with the problems it was created to solve. Thus if
the community values deemed worthy of protection in 1916 remain
unprotected today, an even greater degree of property control would
seem justified.
Amortization
To supply this greater degree of control, many cities have resorted
to amortization of nonconforming uses as a compromise between
immediate termination and gradual starvation.7 2 Under this plan the
nonconformist must amortize his investment within a reasonable
period, at the end of which he must conform or get out.
Amortization is not new, 73 but it is just now coming into its own.
In the past decade, there have been numerous decisions upholding this
plan. In 1950, a Federal court upheld a Tallahassee ordinance requir-
ing termination of nonconforming service stations within ten years.7 4
In 1954, a California court approved a Los Angeles ordinance requiring
termination of a nonconforming plumbing shop in a conforming
building within five years.75 In 1957, the Maryland Court of Appeals
upheld a Baltimore ordinance requiring the removal of billboards
from residential districts within five years.76 In the same year, the
Supreme Court of Kansas upheld a county ordinance requiring an
automobile wrecking business to be removed within two years.7 7 In
1958, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the validity of a Buffalo
ordinance which required cessation of a nonconforming junkyard
within three years.
78
Writers are acclaiming amortization as "the only positive method
of getting rid of nonconforming uses yet devised . . . ,"70 and pro-
72 Norton, "Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures," 20 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 305, 810 (1955).
7 3 Amortization was approved as early as 1929 in Louisiana where a non-
conforming drugstore and grocery store were forced to close within one year.
State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929);
State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 128 So. 814 (1929); the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the McDonald case, 280 U.S. 556 (1929).74 Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F. 2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied 840 U.S. 892 (1950).
75 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 442, 274 P. 2d 84 (1954).
76 Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 801, 129 A. 2d
863 (1957).
77 Spurgeon v. Board of Com'rs of Shawnee County, 181 Kan. 1008, 317
P. 2d 798 (1957).
78 Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y. 2d 558, 152 N.E. 2d 42 (1958). For
cases rejecting amortization provisions, see City of Corpus Christi v. Allen, 254
S.W. 2d 759 (Tex. 1953); City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116
N.E. 2d 697 (1953); J. C. James v. City of Greenville, 88 S.E. 2d 661 (S.C. 1955).
79 Reifman, "Amortization of Nonconforming Uses," 38 Chi. B.R. 13, 16
(Oct. 1956); Note, 85 Va. L. Rev. 348, 357 (1949); Note, 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 286,
290 (1952); Comment, 26 Chi. L. Rev. 442, 444 (1959).
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fessional planners have recently demonstrated their faith in it by its
incorporation in the Chicago8" and New Yorks ' zoning amendments.
Kentucky, as early as 1942, made amortization available to cities
of the first class by statute.8 2 However, it could not long endure the
conservative climate and was repealed in 1948 before ever being
tested in the Court of Appeals. In spite of the unfavorable legislative
history, at least one Kentucky city has an amortization provision
today,8 3 but the grace period has long since expired and no attempt
has been made to enforce it.
Like other elimination devices, amortization has its pros and cons.
It must face the objection of being retroactive. The cases answer,
that to the extent zoning ordinances affect property which is owned
prior to their adoption, they are all retroactive; therefore, immediate
termination, amortization, and the customary limitation of existing
uses differ only in degree, not in kind, 84 and all are directed toward
the same end-the advantages secured from a well planned com-
munity.85 Relaxation of our distrust of retroactive legislation to a
degree of land-use control capable of effecting the objects of zoning
which are beyond the reach of prospective legislation would seem
justified.
In a vigorous dissent in Harbison v. City of Buffalo,86 Judge Van
Voorhis argued that amortization is an attempt to gain benefits for
the community without compensation-that it is small-time urban
redevelopment in the guise of the police power-and that such public
advantage may be obtained only by condemnation. But all planning
and zoning laws are attempts to obtain benefits for the community;
at the same time they protect the community from economic and
environmental losses. Benefit and loss are but two sides of the same
80 See Babcock, "The New Chicago Zoning Ordinance," 52 Nw. U. L. Rev.
174, 189 (1957).
81 See Committee Report, "The City Planning Commission's Proposal for a
New Zoning Resolution," 15 Record N.Y.C.B.A. 119, 127 (1960).82 Ky. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 8.83 Lexington, Ky., Zoning Ordinance-Resolution § 5.21 (1953) provides:
Any building, structure or use lawfully existing at the time of
enactment of this Ordinance-Resolution may be continued indefinitely,
except that any non-conforming sign, billboard and other similar
structure valued at $750.00 or less, and any nonconforming use of
land not involving any structure may be continued for a period not
to exceed two (2) years after enactment of this Ordinance-Resolution,
where upon such structure shall be removed and such use shall cease
and the evidence thereof be removed.84 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, supra note 75, 274 P. 2d at 44; see Babcock,
"The New Chicago Zoning Ordinance, supra note 80 at 191.
85 Noel, "Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances," 41 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 459
(1941).
804 N.Y. 2d 553, 152 N.E. 2d 42 (1958).
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coin-for every benefit there is necessarily a loss, and for every loss a
benefit. Judge Van Voorhis looks only to the past, seeing the benefit
amortization would bring by removing the cause of existing blight
and congestion, and is blind to the future losses which will result from
these same causes. Surely he would not argue that the police power
may not be exercised to protect from future loss. In the very case he
i deciding, the ordinance attempts to protect the public by eliminating
4 nonconforming junkyard which destroys economic, health, safety,
aesthetic, and perhaps other values of the community. Undeniably
it is seeking a benefit by restoring these values, but by the same
process it is protecting against future loss.
The critical defect in the amortization concept, as it is now applied,
lies in fixing the grace period. Under present theory this period is
determined by considering such factors as the remaining useful life
of the structure, the value of the property for a nonconforming use,
the nearest relocation area, and the cost of such relocation.8 7 The
cases reason that during the grace period thus set, the nonconformist
is given a monopolistic position in his neighborhood to compensate
his ultimate loss. 8 8 Upon such reasoning rests the whole validity of
amortization as a reasonable cutting off of investment expectations; it
assumes the loss of these expectations will be recompensed entirely
by operation of an ordinance-created monopoly.
But the assumption that a monopoly-at least a period of increased
profits sufficient to recover the investment-is granted by operation
of the ordinance is questionable.8 9 Although experience has proved
that nonconforming uses manage to survive because of their monopo-
listic position, it has not been established by authoritative study that
the profits actually increase. It could well be that a nonconforming
store was the only one of its kind in the neighborhood prior to the
ordinance, and merely because a zoning ordinance is passed does not
guarantee increased profits. Under present variance procedure it is
even questionable if the enactment of a zoning ordinance guarantees
against a decrease in profits, which might result from the next door
neighbor securing a use variance to establish a competitive business.90
Whether the so-called monopoly will actually benefit a particular
nonconforming business also depends upon the nature of that business.
If it is one which depends primarily upon the neighborhood for its
87 Id. 152 N.E. 2d at 47.
88 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, supra note 75, 274 P. 2d at 44.89 Anderson, "The Nonconforming Use-A Product of Euclidean Zoning," 10
Syracuse L. Rev. 214, 288 (1959).9 0 See Horack and Nolan, Land Use Controls 176 (1955); Comment, 48
Nw. U.L. Rev. 470, 480 (1953).
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patronage, such as a drug store or beauty parlor, increased profits
are at least possible, but if the business is not dependent upon the
locality for its market, such as a factory or junkyard, few if any
additional benefits will accrue from being protected from like uses
in the particular neighborhood.
To the complaints of the property owners that the benefits derived
from their "monopolistic position" are more imaginary than real, may
be added the recent concern of some planners that the amortization
period is too long to be of use in effecting the objects of zoning.
Because the time increases directly with the size of the investment,
grace periods of a hundred years are conceivable in cases of new
buildings of modern construction. The prospect of such prolonged
periods has prompted one writer to describe amortization as a "post-
ponement rather than a solution."91 It is generally agreed that amorti-
zation cannot serve its designed purpose if more than ten years are
necessary to recover the investment.02 The late Professor Horack com-
mented that "When amortization is fixed for a period of 10 to 20 years,
we are not resolving the problem; we are avoiding it. Recognizing
the early zoning philosophy that 'Rome was not built in a day,' I think
that it is time that we admit if Rome is to be rebuilt we had better
undertake the task immediately."93 As another writer observed, "If a
protracted period of amortization is required it will extend beyond
the date of accurate prediction of land needs of the community ...
[The] zoning ordinance has not been devised which will withstand
the impact of five years experience."94 Because of the protracted
period, it is evident that amortization can be effective as it presently
operates only as it applies to uses involving limited investment,
namely, nonconforming uses in impermanent nonconforming structures,
or in conforming structures, or not involving a structure. 95
Amortization can be a useful tool in reducing the environmental
and property-depreciation burdens imposed on the community, and it
can effect these results without imposing an intolerable economic
burden on the nonconforming property owner-but only if the present
formula for determining the grace period is revised to take into
consideration the effect of the use on the community as well as the
hardship to the individual. The factor usually determinative of the
91 Anderson, "The Nonconforming Use-A Product of Euclidean Zoning,"
supra note 89.9 2 Norton, "Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures," 20 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 305, 311 (1955).
93 Horack, "Emerging Legal Issues in Zoning," 1954 Planning 146, 151.94 Anderson, "The Nonconforming Use-A Product of Euclidean Zoning,"
supra note 89 at 239.
95 Norton, 'Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures," supra note 92.
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length of the period is the remaining useful life of the structure. In
the Tallahassee case,96 however, the court evidently did not think it
necessary to connect the time limit on the use with its economic life.
The court recognized the "considerable" investment in a nonconform-
ing service station, but held that "considerations of financial loss or of
so-called 'vested rights' in private property are insufficient to outweigh
the necessity for legitimate exercise of the police power of a munici-
pality."97 This reasoning would permit incorporation of community
effect as an element of the amortization formula and proportionately
shorten the grace period.
It should not be shortened indiscriminately to achieve quick results
without fairness to the individual. To best serve both public and
private interests, the period must be limited to a maximum of ten to
fifteen years, and a scheme of assured compensation must be perfected
to allow the nonconformist to recover his investment within that time.
During the grace period, the economic burden to be imposed
on the owner could be somewhat relieved in advance installments by
allowing him a rebate on property taxes. Municipality tax rebates
require state legislative approval, but a classification for rebate to
those who are forced to terminate their business would be reasonable.
This method would have the advantage of spreading the burden to
the public beneficiaries without the sudden effect of condemnation
on the municipal treasury, and would be noticeable only in cases of
large enterprises upon which small communities are revenue de-
pendent. To this compensation may be added whatever increase in
profits is found actually attributable to the monopolistic position
granted by the ordinance. At the expiration of the grace period, there
is some authority for deducting the cost of termination as a loss for
income tax purposes.98 Finally, of course, the owner will recover
whatever value his property has as a conforming use; it might be
possible to grant him a transferable tax rebate running with his old
property so as to increase its sales price.
If the owner is not sufficiently compensated by these means,
others must be found; amortization is justified only to the extent it
actually pays its way. If amortization proves inadequate even with
these compensatory devices, this would be a good place to consider
the use of public purchase or eminent domain. It would be neither
96 Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahasee, supra note 74.
97 Id. at 413.98 See Chesbro v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 21 T. C. 123 (1953),
aff'd. 225 F. 2d 674 (2d Cir. 1955), where deduction was allowed for loss of a
$10,000 building razed by corporate taxpayer in compliance with city's exercise
of its police power (fire regulations).
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unreasonable nor impracticable in most cases to assess the neighboring
property owners for the uncompensated difference between actual
compensation and total value of investment-the purchase price will
have become more reasonably related to the public gain.
In addition to its theoretical objections, amortization has its prac-
tical difficulties. Commonly amortization, like the traditional methods
of eliminating nonconformities, fails to look at the use and con-
sequently operates to eradicate desirable as well as undesirable uses.
As previously observed certain educational, religious, recreational,
and even business uses may be desirable and not truly incompatible
with a residential environment. Discrimination between land uses
might raise a problem of equal protection of law, but it is believed
that a reasonable classification based on community needs would be
valid. The amortization provision upheld in the Tallahassee case9
applied only to service stations. And the new Chicago zoning ordi-
nance exempts from the amortization requirements such uses as
grocery stores, drug stores, beauty parlors, and shoe and hat repair
shops.'0
0
One of the greatest obstacles facing amortization is enforecment,
which Babcock has described as "an administrative migraine headache
of gigantic proportions."1 1 Many insubstantial investments such as
billboards and out-buildings are classified together for amortization
purposes and assigned uniform grace periods which will expire
simultaneously. The periods of the larger investments will expire
frequently enough that there will be a deluge of complaints and
litigation.
Even if the enforcement problem is overcome, there is a resulting
problem of what to do with the nonconforming structures after their
owners have been forced to abandon them. Should the additional
burden of razing his building be imposed on the owner? Obviously,
if amortization is to accomplish anything at all, provision must be
made for extermination as well as termination.102
Conclusion
Unless we are ready to make the swing over to performance
standards as a solution to our environmental and property-deprecia-
tion problems, we are stuck with the nonconforming uses of Euclidean
09 Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, supra note 74.
100 See Babcock, "The New Chicago Zoning Ordinance," 52 Nw. U. L. Rev.
174, 193, n. 74 (1957).
101 Babcock, "Emerging Legal Issues in Zoning," 1954 Planning 133, 137.
102 Note, 30 Ind. L.J. 521, 532 (1954).
160 KErucxy LAw JoUmNAL [Vol. 49,
zoning. The traditional means of eliminating these scourges of the
community by restricting their future expansion have proved ineffec-
tive as they thrive indefinitely in their present condition. These
methods should be abandoned and replaced by an overhauled version
of amortization which guarantees full recovery of investment within
a relatively short period of time, during which the owner is forbidden
only from creating a more objectionable use. By thus balancing the
equities, zoning can achieve for the public a better planned community
without unreasonably infringing upon private property rights.
Robert G. Zweigart
